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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
Case No. 18108

WOODROW WILLIE JOHN,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
-

This is an appeal from a conviction for Attempted Rape,
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5402 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth
Rigtrup, Judge, presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Woodrow Willie John, was charged in an
Information with Attempted Rape, a Third Degree Felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-402 (1953 as amended), and with Forcible
Sexual Abuse, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-404 (1953 as amended).

On the 15th day of October,

1981, the appellant was convicted by·a jury of Attempted Rape.
On the 26th day of October, 1981, the appellant was sentenced
to incarceration in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Woodrow Willie John, seeks to have the
judgment entered against him vacated, or reversed and remanded
to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial.

STATE:MENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on July 9, 1981, Ruth Robinson
was getting into her car in a parking lot near 200 West South
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, when she was accosted by an individual
who slid into the car with her.

The individual made sexual

advances on Mrs. Robinson, until he was interrupted by a young
man walking through the parking lot who saw and heard the struggle
going on in the car.

The young man watched as the assailant

exited the car and walked away, while Mrs. Robinson locked the
doors and windows, started the car, and began pulling away in
such a frenzied state that" she almost had an accident.

The

young man stopped Mrs. Robinson, then asked two other individuals
in the parking lot to summon the police, which they did.
(T.

9-17, 52-55)
Later that evening, Mrs. Robinson was driven to the St.

Mark's Half-Way House by a police officer.

The appellant was

brought out of the facility by a police officer, where Mrs.
Robinson could see him.

She could not make a positive identification,

so the officer took her to within 4 or 5 feet of the appellant.
She was still uncertain, and asked that the appellant say something.
When the appellant used the word "lady", as had Mrs. Robinson's

-2-
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assailant, she said she was sure this was the person.

(T. 26-

28, 90-91) Defense counsel moved to strike the in court identification

of the appellant by Mrs. Robinson because it was tainted by
the prior suggestive show-up.

The motion was denied.

(T. 101,

105)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE THE
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF RUTH ROBINSON.
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed. 2d 401 (1972),
the unreliability of unduly suggestive eyewitness identification
procedures.

The court indicated five factors important in assessing

the likelihood of misidentification:
The opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness'
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation. 409 U.S. at 199
The authorities agree that eyewitness identification
is a highly unreliable source of evidence at best, 1 and

1. See Buckhout, "Eyewitness Testimony", 231 Scientific American
23 (1974); Buckhout, "Psychology and Eyewitness Testimony",
2 Law and Psych. Rev. 75 (1976); Doob & Kirshenbaum, "Bias in
Police Line-ups--Partial Remembering'', 1 J. of Police Science
and Admin. 287 (1973), Loftus, "Reconstructing Memory: The
Incredible Eyewitness", 15 Jurimetrics J. 188 (1975): Murray
"The Criminal Line-Up at Home and Abroad", Utah 1, Rev. 610
(1966) n.2.

-3-
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subsequent studies have shown that the reliability of eyewitness
identification is poor even where all five of the Neil v. Biggers
factors are optimal. 2 But in the present case, two of the five
factors would indicate a high unreliability of Mrs. Robinson's
identification of the appellant as her

assailant.

The five

factors as applied to the present case are as follows:
1.

Mrs. Robinson's opportunity to observe her assailant

was very good, because she was with him for several minutes
in broad daylight at a close
2.

proximity~

Mrs. Robinson's degree of attention to her assailant

would have been very high, since the incident involved an attach
on her person.
3.

Mrs. Robinson's description of her assailant was

a poor match with the appellant.

She described her assailant

as 250-300 pounds, more than 100 pounds heavier than the appellant's
weight; she said her assailant was wearing a red T-shirt, while
the appellant was found wearing a flannel shirt a short time
later, and no evidence was introduced that the appellant even
owned a red T-shirt; and Mrs. Robinson remembered her assailant

2. See Uelman, "Testing the Assumptions of Neil v. Biggers:
An Experiment in Eyewitness Identification", 16 Crim. Law Bulletin
358 (1980).

-4-
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as wearing his hair differently than did the appellant.

(T.

26' 44)
4.

Mrs. Robinson was not at all certain as to her

identification~

even after she viewed the appellant from a few feet away in
a one-on-one show-up.
5.

The time elapsed between the event and the identification

was only a matter of hours.
It can be seen that, under the Neil v. Biggers analysis
set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the present identification
was very weak on two of five points.

Furthermore, the identification

was made under the most suggestive of circumstances possible-the witness was shown a person already in the custody of the
police and, knowing him to be the only suspect in the case,
could only make a very tentative initial identification, until
the person happened to say the word "lady", a very common means
of addressing adult females.
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed its own concern
with suggestive identification procedures.

In State v. Ervin,

22 Utah 2d 216, 451 P.2d 372 (Utah 1969), the court stated:
We are in accord with the idea that a line-up should
be neither so devised nor manipulated as to impel
or to be unduly suggestive as to identification.
Ideally it should be regarded as having a dual
purpose. On the one hand: to help in searching
out and identifying those guilty of crime. On
the other, the equally important corollary: to
protect those who are suspected of crime but who
are innocent. To best serve both purposes the
procedure should be handled with caution not to
place blame on the innocent, and yet not so laden
with difficulties nor burdened with super-cautions
as to make it impractical as a method of identifying
the guilty.
451 P.2d at 374-75
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And finally, in an apparent effort to serve the "dual
purpose" of the line-up procedure, the Legislature drafted Chapter
8 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure in 1980, outlining

An

the circumstances and procedures for conducting line-ups.

arrested suspect may be required by a peace officer to appear
in a line-up - - otherwise, a magis.trate' s order is required
upon a finding of probable cause. 3

Section 77-8-2 assures the

suspect of the right to have counsel present at the line-up,
and Section 77-8-4 requires the entire procedure to be recorded,
allowing the suspect access to such records.

And, perhaps most

importantly in the present case, Section 77-8-3 forbids peace
officers from "attempt[ing] to influence the identification
of any particular suspect."
None of the statutory requirements of Chapter 8 were
followed in the present instance.

The appellant was not arrested

and in custody at the time of the show-up, nor had any magistrate's
order issued.

No counsel was present, the appellant had no

opportunity to procure counsel, nor was he even made aware of
any such right.

No record was made of the proceedings.

And

finally, the entire purpose of bringing Mrs. Robinson to the
St. Mark's facility was to get her to confirm the officer's
choice of the appellant as her assailant.

The police literally

pointed out the man they wanted Mrs. Robinson to identify.

3.

Utah Code Ann. §77-8-1 (1953 as amended)
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The requirements of Chapter 8 are clear, and the failure
to comply with them in the present instance is equally clear.
The opportunity to comply with Chapter 8 was also present -there were no special or exigent circumstances requiring an
innnediate identification.
If compliance with Chapter 8 is not required in the present
instance, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where the
police could not circumvent Chapter 8 in the same manner as
in the case at bar.

Whenever the police wished to conduct a

suggestive show-up, avoiding the admittedly more burdensome
but more reliable Chapter 8 procedure, they could merely bring
the purported eyewitness along when they make the arrest, and
have the witness "identify" the individual before the arrest
is made.

Such a reading of Chapter 8 would make its provisions

meaningless, and effective only as a suggestion -- i.e.·' the
police may comply with Chapter 8 only if they so choose.
Since the police chose not to comply with Chapter 8 in
the case at bar, and have shown no exigency requiring non-compliance,
the appellant's motion to strike the identification testimony
of Mrs. Robinson was improperly denied by the trial court.
lower court's decision should be reversed.
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The

POINT

IL~

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT.
The evidence presented by the State was insufficient
to support the verdict rendered.

The standard for reviewing

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was stated by
this Court in State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272, 1272 (Utah 1975):
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conviction, it must appear that viewing the evidence
and all inferences that may reasonbly be drawn
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury, reasonable minds could not believe
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To set aside
a verdict it must appear that the evidence was
so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable
minds acting fairly must have entertained reasonable
doubt that defendant committed the crime.
Applying _this standard to the present case, the identification
of the appellant by Mrs. Robinson was "so inconclusive [and]
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds .

must have entertained

reasonable doubt" as to whether or not the appellant was Mrs.
Robinson's assailant.
The inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony must
be taken into consideration.

Reasonable persons do not unduly

rely on unreliable evidence.

The fact that Mrs. Robinson's

testimony failed to comply with two of the five Neil v. Biggers
criteria adds to its unreliability.
The failure of Mrs. Robinson's description of her assailant
to match the physical size of the appellant, together with her
uncertainty as to her visual identification of the appellant,
her undue reliance on the appellant's use of the word "lady",
and the complete absence of physical evidence identifvina rno
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appellant as the assailant, all would lead a reasonable juror
to entertain reasonable doubts as to the identification. . For
this reason the conviction should be vacated.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in refusing to strike Ruth Robinson's
identificatin testimony, because of the use of unnecessarily
suggestive identification p:c-ocedures by t.he .1'olic~, in violation
of the appellant's due process . :r:.ights under the Constitution
and in violation of Chapter 8 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure.
Furthermore, the eyewitness identification of the appellant
by Ruth Robinson was so fraught with unreliability and uncertainty
that a reasonable juror could not have found the appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The case should be reversed and

remanded for a new trial.
DATED this

J7

day of September, 1982.
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Attorney for Appellant
Delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of September, 1982.
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